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Abstract—In this article, we study the problem of secret
key generation in the multiterminal source model, where the
terminals have access to correlated Gaussian sources. We assume
that the sources form a Markov chain on a tree. We give a
nested lattice-based key generation scheme whose computational
complexity is polynomial in the number, N , of independent and
identically distributed samples observed by each source. We
also compute the achievable secret key rate and give a class of
examples where our scheme is optimal in the fine quantization
limit. However, we also give examples that show that our scheme
is not always optimal in the limit of fine quantization.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study secret key (SK) generation in the multiterminal
source model, where m terminals possess correlated Gaussian
sources. Each terminal observes N independent and identically
distributed (iid) samples of its source. The terminals have
access to a noiseless public channel of infinite capacity, and
their objective is to agree upon a secret key by communicating
across the public channel. The key must be such that any
eavesdropper having access to the public communication must
not be able to guess the key. In other words, the key must be
independent (or almost independent) of the messages commu-
nicated across the channel. A measure of performance is the
secret key rate that can be achieved, which is the number of
bits of secret key generated per (source) sample. On the other
hand, the probability that any terminal is unable to reconstruct
the key correctly should be arbitrarily small.
The discrete setting — the case where the correlated sources
take values in a finite alphabet — was studied by Csisza´r
and Narayan [2]. They gave a scheme for computing a
secret key in this setting and found the secret key capacity,
i.e., the maximum achievable secret key rate. This was later
generalized by Nitinawarat and Narayan [9] to the case where
the terminals possess correlated Gaussian sources.
In a practical setting, we can assume that the random
sources are obtained by observing some natural parameters,
e.g., temperature in a field. In other words, the underlying
source is continuous. However, for the purposes of storage
and computation, these sources must be quantized, and only
the quantized source can be used for secret key generation. If
each terminal uses a scalar quantizer, then we get the discrete
source model studied in [2]. However, we could do better
and instead use a vector quantizer to obtain a higher secret
key rate. Nitinawarat and Narayan [9] found the secret key
capacity for correlated Gaussian sources in such a setting.
However, to approach capacity, the quantization rate and the
rate of public communication at each terminal must approach
infinity. In practice, it is reasonable to have a constraint on
the quantization rate at each terminal. The terminals can
only use the quantized source for secret key generation.
Nitinawarat and Narayan [9] studied a two-terminal version
of this problem, where a quantization rate constraint was
imposed on only one of the terminals. They gave a nested
lattice coding scheme and showed that it was optimal, i.e., no
other scheme can give a higher secret key rate. In related work,
Watanabe and Oohama [12] characterized the maximum secret
key rate achievable under a constraint on the rate of public
communication in the two-terminal setting. More recently,
Ling et al. [7] gave a lattice coding scheme for the public
communication-constrained problem and were able to achieve
a secret key rate within 1/2 nats of the maximum in [12].
We consider a multiterminal generalization of the two-
terminal version studied by [9] where quantization rate
constraints are imposed on each of the terminals. Termi-
nal i has access to N iid copies of a Gaussian source
Xi(1), Xi(2), . . . , Xi(N). The sources are correlated across
the terminals. We assume that the joint distribution of the
sources has a Markov tree structure [2, Example 7], which
is a generalization of a Markov chain. Let us define this
formally. Suppose that T = (V,E) is a tree and {Xi : i ∈ V }
is a collection of random variables indexed by the vertices.
Consider any two disjoint subsets I and J of V . Let v be
any vertex such that removal of v from T disconnects I
from J (Equivalently, for every i ∈ I and j ∈ J , the path
connecting i and j passes through v). For every such I,J , v, if
{Xi : i ∈ I} and {Xj : j ∈ J } are conditionally independent
given Xv, then we say that {Xi : i ∈ T } form a Markov chain
on T . Alternatively, we say that {Xi : i ∈ V } is a Markov
tree source.
The contributions of this paper are the following. We study
the problem of secret key generation in a Gaussian Markov
tree source model with individual quantization rate constraints
imposed at each terminal. We give a nested lattice-based
scheme and find the achievable secret key rate. For certain
classes of Markov trees, particularly homogeneous Markov
trees1, we show that our scheme achieves the secret key
1We say that a Markov tree is homogeneous if I(Xu;Xv) is the same for
all edges (u, v)
capacity as the quantization rates go to infinity. However, we
also give examples where our scheme does not achieve the key
capacity. A salient feature of our scheme is that the overall
computational complexity required for quantization and key
generation is polynomial in the number of samples N . It is
also interesting to note that unlike the general schemes in [2],
[9], we give a scheme where at least one terminal remains
silent (does not participate in public communication), and
omniscience is not attained.
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
If I is an index set and {Ai : i ∈ I} is a class of
sets indexed by I, then their Cartesian product is denoted
by×i∈I Ai. Given two sequences indexed by n ∈ N, f(n)
and g(n), we say that f(n) = O(g(n)) if there exists a
constant c such that f(n) ≤ cg(n) for all sufficiently large
n. Furthermore, f(n) = on(1) if f(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph. The distance between two
vertices u and v in G is the length of the shortest path between
u and v. Given a rooted tree T = (V,E) with root r(T ) we say
that a vertex u is the parent of v 6= r(T ), denoted u = par(v),
if u lies in the shortest path from r(T ) to v and the distance
between u and v is 1. Furthermore, for every v ∈ V , we define
NT (v) to be the set of all neighbours of v in T .
III. SECRET KEY GENERATION FROM CORRELATED
GAUSSIAN SOURCES
A. The Problem
We now formally define the problem. We consider a mul-
titerminal Gaussian source model [9], which is described
as follows. There are m terminals, each having access to
N independent and identically distributed (iid) copies of a
correlated Gaussian source, i.e., the lth terminal observes
Xl(1), Xl(2), . . . , Xl(N) which are iid. Without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume that Xl(i) has mean zero and variance
1. We can always subtract the mean and divide by the variance
to ensure that this is indeed the case. The joint distribution of
{Xl(i) : 1 ≤ l ≤ m} can be described by their covariance
matrix Φ.
Specifically, we assume that the sources form a Markov tree,
defined in Sec. I. Let T = (V,E) be a tree having |V | = m
vertices, which defines the conditional independence structure
of the sources. For u, v ∈ V , let us define ρuv := E[XuXv].
We can therefore write
Xu = ρuvXv +
√
1− ρ2
uv
Zuv
where Zuv is a zero-mean, unit-variance Gaussian random
variable which is independent of Xv. Similarly,
Xv = ρuvXu +
√
1− ρ2
uv
Zvu
where Zvu is also a zero-mean, unit-variance Gaussian random
variable which is independent of Xu (and different from Zuv).
Our objective is to generate a secret key using
public communication. For v ∈ V , let XN
v
:=
(Xv(1), Xv(2), . . . , Xv(N)) denote the N iid copies of Xv
available at terminal v. Each terminal uses a vector quantizer
Delete
leaves
Fig. 1. Illustration of T ∗ for a tree having four vertices.
Qv : R
N → Xv of rate R(v)q := 1N log2 |Xv|. Terminal v
transmits F(N)v ∈ F (N)v — which is a (possibly randomized)
function of Qv(XNv ) — across a noiseless public channel
that an eavesdropper may have access to2. Using the public
communication and their respective observations of the quan-
tized random variables, Qv(XNv ), the terminals must generate
a secret key K(N) ∈ K(N) which is concealed from the
eavesdropper. Let FG :=×
v∈V
F
(N)
v .
Fix any ǫ > 0. We say that K(N) is an ǫ-secret key (ǫ-SK)
if there exist functions fv : (Xv,FG)→ K(N) such that:
Pr
[
fv(Qv(X
N
v
), {F(N)
u
: u ∈ V }) 6= K(N)
]
< ǫ,
log2 |K
(N)| −H(K(N)) < ǫ,
and
I
(
{F(N)
v
: v ∈ V };K(N)
)
< ǫ.
We say that Rkey is an achievable secret key rate if for
every ǫ > 0, there exist quantizers {Qv}, a scheme for public
communication, {F(N)v }, and a secret key K(N), such that for
all sufficiently large N , K(N) is an ǫ-SK, and 1N log2 |K
(N)| ≥
Rkey − ǫ.
Consider the following procedure to obtain a class of rooted
subtrees of T :
• Identify a vertex v in V as the root. The tree T with v
as the root is a rooted tree. Call this T ′
v
.
• Delete all the leaves of T ′
v
. Call the resulting rooted
subtree T ∗
v
.
2In this work, we only consider noninteractive communication, i.e., the
public communication is only a function of the source and not of the prior
communication.
Let T ∗ := {T ∗
v
: v ∈ V } denote the set of all rooted subtrees
of T obtained in the above manner. Fig. 1 illustrates this for
a tree having four vertices. Note that there are |V | trees in
T ∗, one corresponding to each vertex. For any such rooted
subtree T ∗ = (V ∗, E∗) in T ∗, let r(T ∗) denote the root of T ∗.
We will see later that it is only the terminals that correspond
to T ∗ that participate in the public communication while the
other terminals remain silent. For any v ∈ V ∗, let NT (v)
denote the set of all neighbours of v in T (not T ∗). Recall that
each terminal v operates under a quantization rate constraint
of R(v)q . For every T ∗ = (V ∗, E∗), us define
Rent = R
(r(T∗))
q
+
∑
u∈V ∗\r(T∗)
1
2
log2
(
(e2R
(u)
q − 1)(1− ρ2
u,par(u)) + 1
)
(1)
and
Rcom =
∑
v∈V ∗
max
u∈NT (v)
1
2
log2
(
(e2R
(v)
q − 1)(1− ρ2
uv
)
+ 1 +
ρ2
uv
e2R
(v)
q
e2R
(u)
q − 1
)
. (2)
We will show that the joint entropy of the quantized sources is
at least Rent and the sum rate of public communication is at
most Rcom in our scheme. Also, the public communication
that achieves Rcom requires only the terminals in T ∗ to
participate in the communication; the terminals in V \V ∗ are
silent. Let us also define
α :=
maxu∈V ∗ R
(u)
q
minv∈V ∗ R
(v)
q
. (3)
Our aim is to prove the following result
Theorem 1. For a fixed quantization rate constraint {R(v)q :
v ∈ V }, a secret key rate of
Rkey = max
T∗∈T ∗
{
Rent −Rcom
}
(4)
is achievable using a nested lattice coding scheme whose
computational complexity grows as O(Nα+1).
Note that if all terminals have identical quantization rate
constraints, then the complexity is O(N2). Sec. V describes
the scheme and contains the proof of the above theorem.
We now discuss some of the implications of the result.
Letting the quantization rates R(u)q in (4) go to infinity, i.e., as
R
(v)
q →∞ for all v, we get that
Corollary 2. In the fine quantization limit, a secret key rate
of
Rkey = max
T∗∈T ∗
{
min
v∈NT (r(T∗))
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ2
r(T∗)v
)
+
∑
u∈V ∗\r(T∗)
min
v∈NT (u)
1
2
log2
(
1− ρ2
u,par(u)
1− ρ2
u,v
)}
(5)
is achievable.
If there are no constraints on the quantization rates, then
from [9, Theorem 3.1] and [2, Example 7], we know that the
maximum achievable secret key rate is
C
(∞)
key = min
(u,v)∈E
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ2
uv
)
. (6)
IV. REMARKS ON THE ACHIEVABLE SECRET KEY RATE
A. The Two-User Case
Consider the two-user case with terminals u and v. Let us
define
R(u, v) :=
1
2
log2
 e2R(u)q
(e2R
(u)
q − 1)(1− ρ2
uv
) + 1 +
ρ2
uv
e2R
(u)
q
e2R
(v)
q −1

As we will see later, the above SK rate is achieved with
u participating in the public communication and v remain-
ing silent. The achievable secret key rate, (4), is equal to
max{R(u, v),R(v, u)}. A simple calculation reveals that
e−2R(u,v) − e−2R(v,u)
= ρ2
uv
(
1
e2R
(v)
q (e2R
(v)
q − 1)
−
1
e2R
(u)
q (e2R
(u)
q − 1)
)
(7)
Hence, if R(v)q > R(u)q , then R(u, v) > R(v, u). This means
that in order to obtain a higher secret key rate using our
scheme, the terminal with the lower quantization rate must
communicate, while the other must remain silent.
If we let R(v)q in R(u, v) go to infinity, then we get the rate
RNN achieved in [9], which was shown to be optimal when
we only restrict the quantization rate of one terminal.
RNN =
1
2
log2
(
e2R
(u)
q
(e2R
(u)
q − 1)(1− ρ2
uv
) + 1
)
.
Fig. 2 illustrates the behaviour of the achievable rate for
different sum-rate constraints (R(u)q + R(v)q = R). The rate
achieved by the scheme of Nitinawarat and Narayan [9], RNN,
is also shown.
B. Optimality of Rkey in the Fine Quantization Limit
We present a class of examples where Rkey is equal to the
secret key capacity C(∞)key in the fine quantization limit. One
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Fig. 2. Plot of achievable secret key rates under a sum rate constraint for two
terminals.
such example is the class of homogeneous Markov trees, where
ρuv = ρ for all edges (u, v). In this case,
min
v∈NT (u)
1
2
log2
(
1− ρ2
u,par(u)
1− ρ2
u,v
)
= 0,
and hence, by Corollary 2,
Rkey =
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ2
)
= C
(∞)
key .
This property holds for a wider class of examples. Consider
the case where T has a rooted subtree T ∗ such that for every
u ∈ V ∗, argmin
v∈NT (u) ρuv = par(u). Once again, we have
min
v∈NT (u)
1
2
log2
(
1− ρ2
u,par(u)
1− ρ2
u,v
)
= 0.
Moreover, the edge (u, v) ∈ E with the minimizing ρuv (and
therefore, the minimizing mutual information) is incident on
r(T ∗). Hence, Rkey = C
(∞)
key .
C. Suboptimality of Rkey in the Fine Quantization Limit
We can give several examples for which Rkey in the fine
quantization limit is strictly less than C(∞)key . Note that
min
v∈NT (u)
1
2
log2
(
1− ρ2
u,par(u)
1− ρ2
u,v
)
≤ 0,
and if these terms are nonzero for every T ∗ ∈ T ∗, then the
scheme is suboptimal. As a specific example, consider the
Markov chain of Fig. 3, where ρ23 > max{ρ12, ρ34}. Let us
further assume that ρ12 = ρ34. The secret key capacity is
C
(∞)
key =
1
2
log2
1
1− ρ212
.
Fig. 3. An example where our scheme is suboptimal.
Irrespective of which T ∗ ∈ T ∗ we choose (see Fig. 3), we
have
min
v∈NT (r(T∗))
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ2
r(T∗)v
)
= C
(∞)
key .
Furthermore, the second term in (5) is negative for every T ∗.
This is because every T ∗ has some u 6= r(T ∗) for which
argminv∈V ∗ ρuv 6= par(v).
V. THE SECRET KEY GENERATION SCHEME
We now describe the lattice coding scheme that achieves
the promised secret key rate. Our scheme is very similar to
the scheme given by Nitinawarat and Narayan [9] for the two-
terminal case.
We use a block encoding scheme just like the one in [9].
Recall that each terminal v has a quantization rate constraint
of R(v)q . The total blocklength N is partitioned into Nout
blocks of n samples each, i.e., N = nNout, where Nout =
minv 2
nR(v)q − 1. The secret key generation scheme comprises
two phases: an information reconciliation phase, and a privacy
amplification phase. The reconciliation phase is divided into
two subphases: a lattice coding-based analog phase, which
is followed by a Reed-Solomon coding-based digital phase.
The privacy amplification phase employs a linear mapping to
generate the secret key from the reconciled information. This
uses the results of Nitinawarat and Narayan [9]. The digital
phase is also inspired by the concatenated coding scheme used
in [11] in the context of channel coding for Gaussian channels.
Let us briefly outline the protocol for secret key generation.
Each terminal v uses a chain of nested lattices (Λv,Λ(1)v ,Λ(2)v )
in Rn, where Λ(2)v ⊂ Λ(1)v ⊂ Λv. The Gaussian input xv at
terminal v is processed blockwise, with n samples collected
to form a block. Suppose xv = (x(1)v , . . . ,x(Nout)v ) where
x
(i)
v denotes the ith block of length n. Each terminal v also
generates random dithers {d(i)v : 1 ≤ i ≤ Nout}, which are all
uniformly distributed over the fundamental Voronoi region of
Λv, and independent of each other. These are assumed to be
known to all terminals.3 The protocol for secret key generation
is as follows.
• Quantization: Terminal v ∈ V computes
y(i)
v
=
[
QΛv(x
(i)
v
+ d(i)
v
)− d(i)
v
]
mod Λ(2)
v
.
• Information reconciliation: Analog phase: Let T ∗ =
(V ∗, E∗) be the rooted subtree which achieves the max-
imum in (4). Terminal v ∈ V ∗ broadcasts
w(i)
v
= [y(i)
v
] mod Λ(1)
v
.
across the public channel. Terminal u has access to y(i)u
and for every v ∈ NT∗(u), it estimates
ŷ(i)
v
= w(i)
v
+Q
Λ
(1)
v
(
ρuvy
(i)
u
−w(i)
v
)
.
Having estimated y(i)v for all neighbours v, it estimates
y
(i)
v for all v which are at a distance 2 from u, and so
on, till it has estimated {y(i)v : v ∈ V ∗, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nout}.
• Information reconciliation: Digital phase: To ensure that
all Nout blocks can be recovered at all terminals with an
arbitrarily low probability of error, we use a Slepian-Wolf
scheme using Reed-Solomon codes. Each terminal uses
an (Nout,Kout) Reed-Solomon code over Fpkv , where
the parameters Kout and pkv will be specified later.
The syndrome corresponding to4 (y(1)v , . . . ,y(Nout)v ) in
the code is publicly communicated by terminal v. We
show that this can be used by the other terminals to
estimate all the y(i)v s with a probability of error that
decays exponentially in N .
• Key generation: We use the result [9, Lemma 4.5] that
there exists a linear transformation of the source symbols
(viewed as elements of a certain finite field) that can act
as the secret key. Since all terminals can estimate {y(i)v :
v ∈ V ∗, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nout} reliably, they can all compute the
secret key with an arbitrarily low probability of error.
Before we go into the details of each step, we describe some
specifics of the coding scheme. We want the nested lattices that
form the main component of our protocol to satisfy certain
“goodness” properties. We begin by describing the features
that the lattices must possess.
A. Nested Lattices
Some basic definitions and relevant results on lattices have
been outlined in Appendix A. Given a lattice Λ, we let V(Λ) be
the fundamental Voronoi region of Λ, and σ2(Λ) denotes the
second moment per dimension of Λ. Furthermore, we define
vol(Λ) := vol(V(Λ)).
Each terminal v uses a chain of n-dimensional nested
lattices (Λv,Λ(1)v ,Λ(2)v ), with Λ(2)v ⊂ Λ(1)v ⊂ Λv. These are
all Construction-A lattices [3], [4] obtained from linear codes
3In principle, the random dither is not required. Similar to [8], we can show
that there exist fixed dithers for which all our results hold. One could avoid
the use of dithers by employing the techniques in [7], but we do not take that
approach here.
4We show that there is a bijection between Λv/Λ(2)v and Fpkv .
of blocklength n over Fp, with p chosen large enough to ensure
that these lattices satisfy the required goodness properties.
Furthermore, Λ(1)v and Λ(2)v are obtained from subcodes of
linear codes that generate Λv. Fix any δ > 0. The lattices are
chosen so that
1
n
log2 |Λv∩V(Λ
(2)
v
)| =
1
n
log2
vol(Λ(2)v )
vol(Λv)
=
kv
n
log2 p = R
(v)
q ,
(8)(
vol(Λ
(2)
v )
)2/n
2πe
=
(
1 + σ2(Λv)
)
(1 + δ), (9)
and(
vol(Λ
(1)
v )
)2/n
2πe
= max
u∈NT (v)
(
1− ρ2
uv
+ σ2(Λv) + ρ
2
uv
σ2(Λu)
)
× (1 + δ). (10)
Furthermore, these lattices satisfy the following “goodness”
properties [4]:
• Λv is good for covering.
• Λ
(1)
v and Λ(2)v are good for AWGN channel coding.
B. Quantization
Terminal v observes N samples xv = (xv(1), . . . , xv(N)).
As mentioned earlier, the quantizer operates on blocks of n
samples each, and there are Nout such blocks. We can write
x = (x
(1)
u ,x
(2)
u , . . . ,x
(Nout)
u ), where x(j)u ∈ Rn is given by
x
(j)
u = (xu((j − 1)n+ 1), . . . , xu(jn)).
Terminal v also generates Nout dither vectors
d
(1)
v ,d
(2)
v , . . . ,d
(Nout)
v , which are all uniformly distributed
over V(Λv), and independent of each other and of everything
else. These dither vectors are assumed to be known to all the
terminals, and to the eavesdropper.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ Nout and v ∈ V , let
y(i)
v
= [QΛv(x
(i)
v
+ d(i)
v
)− d(i)
v
] mod Λ(2)
v
(11)
denote the output of the lattice quantizer at terminal v. The
terminals can only use yv := (y(1)v ,y(2)v , . . . ,y(Nout)v ) for the
secret key generation protocol. From (8) and (9), we can see
that the quantization rates satisfy
R(v)q =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
σ2(Λv)
)
+ log2(1 + δ) + on(1). (12)
C. Information Reconciliation: The Analog Phase
Let T ∗ = (V ∗, E∗) denote the rooted tree in T ∗ which
achieves the maximum in (4). The terminals in V ∗ are the only
ones that communicate across the public channel. Terminal
v ∈ V ∗ broadcasts
w(i)
v
:= [y(i)
v
] mod Λ(1)
v
= [QΛv(x
(i)
v
+ d(i)
v
)] mod Λ(1)
v
(13)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ Nout, across the public channel. Prior to
the analog phase, terminal u ∈ V only has access to
yu = (y
(1)
u ,y
(2)
u , . . . ,y
(Nout)
u ). At the end of the information
reconciliation phase, every terminal u will be able to recover
{yv : v ∈ V
∗} with low probability of error. The analog phase
ensures that every y(i)v can be individually recovered with low
probability of error. The digital phase guarantees that the entire
block yv can be recovered reliably.
Now consider any v ∈ V ∗ and u ∈ NT (v) (not necessarily
in V ∗). Suppose that some terminal u′ (not necessarily u) has
a reliable estimate of y(i)u . From y(i)u and w(i)v , terminal u′
can estimate y(i)v as follows:
ŷ(i)
v
= w(i)
v
+ Q
Λ
(1)
v
(
ρuvy
(i)
u
−w(i)
v
)
. (14)
The following proposition is proved in Appendix B-A.
Proposition 3. Fix a δ > 0. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ Nout, we have
E
y
(i)
u
Pr[ŷ(i)
v
6= y(i)
v
] ≤ e−nEuv(δ) (15)
where Euv is a quantity which is positive for all positive δ and
all sufficiently large n, as long as(
vol(Λ
(1)
v )
)2/n
2πe
> max
u∈NT (v)
(
1− ρ2
uv
+ σ2(Λv) + ρ
2
uv
σ2(Λu)
)
× (1 + δ), (16)(
vol(Λ
(2)
v )
)2/n
2πe
> (1 + σ2(Λv))(1 + δ), (17)
and (
vol(Λ
(2)
u )
)2/n
2πe
> (1 + σ2(Λu))(1 + δ). (18)
Since terminal u has y(i)u , it can (with high probability)
recover the corresponding quantized sources of its neighbours.
Assuming that these have been recovered correctly, it can then
estimate the quantized sources of all terminals at distance two
from u, and so on, till all y(i)v for v in V ∗ have been recovered.
Using the union bound, we can say that the probability that
terminal u correctly recovers {y(i)v : v ∈ V ∗} is at least 1 −∑
u∈V ∗ maxv∈NT (u) e
−nEuv(δ)
.
For all terminals to be able to agree upon the key, we must
ensure that every terminal can recover all blocks {yv : v ∈
V ∗} with low probability of error. Since Nout is exponential
in n, the analog phase does not immediately guarantee this.
For that, we use the digital phase.
D. Information Reconciliation: The Digital Phase
Observe that y(i)v ∈ Λv ∩ V(Λ(2)v ), where both Λv and Λ(2)v
are Construction-A lattices obtained by linear codes over Fp.
As a result, |Λv∩V(Λ(2)v )| is always an integer power of p [4].
Let
|Λv ∩ V(Λ
(2)
v
)| = pkv .
Then, there exists an (set) isomorphism ϕv from Λv∩V(Λ(2)v )
to Fpkv . For every v ∈ V ∗ and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nout}, let y
(i)
v =
ϕv(y
(i)
v ). Similarly, let ŷ(i)v = ϕv(ŷ(i)v ).
The key component of the digital phase is a Reed-Solomon
code over Fpkv . In [9], a Slepian-Wolf scheme with random
linear codes was used for the digital phase. Using a Reed-
Solomon code, we can ensure that the overall computational
complexity (including all the phases of the protocol) is poly-
nomial in N .
For every v, let Cv be a Reed-Solomon code of blocklength
Nout and dimension
Kout = Nout(1− 2δ). (19)
Let yNout
v
= (y
(1)
v , y
(2)
v , . . . , y
(Nout)
v ) and ŷNoutv =
(ŷ
(1)
v , ŷ
(2)
v , . . . , ŷ
(Nout)
v ). We can write
ŷ
Nout
v
= yNout
v
+ eNout
v
,
where eNout
v
= (e
(1)
v , e
(2)
v , . . . , e
(Nout)
v ) is the error vector, and
from the previous section, we have
Pr[e(i)
v
6= 0] ≤
∑
v∈V ∗
max
u∈NT (v)
e−nEuv(δ) ≤ δ
for all sufficiently large n. Every yNout
v
can be written uniquely
as
y
Nout
v
= cNout
v
+ sNout
v
(20)
where cNout
v
∈ Cv, and sNoutv is a minimum Hamming weight
representative of the coset to which yNout
v
belongs in FNout
pkv
/Cv.
Terminal v broadcasts sNout
v
across the public channel. This
requires a rate of public communication of at most
1
N
log2 |F
Nout
pkv
/Cv| =
2Noutδ
N
log2(p
kv) = 2δR(v)q . (21)
From sNout
v
and ŷNout
v
, terminal u can compute
ĉ
Nout
v
= ŷNout
v
− sNout
v
= cNout
v
+ eNout
v
.
For sufficiently large n the probability that y(i)v is estimated
incorrectly is less than δ, and terminal u can recover cNout
v
with
high probability using the decoder for the Reed-Solomon code.
Proposition 4 (Theorem 2, [11]). The probability that the
Reed-Solomon decoder incorrectly decodes cNout
v
from ĉNout
v
decays exponentially in N .
Having recovered cNout
v
reliably, the terminals can obtain
y
Nout
v
using (20). Therefore, at the end of the digital phase,
all terminals can recover {yv : v ∈ V ∗} with a probability of
error that decays exponentially in N .
E. Secret Key Generation
Let k :=
∑
v∈V ∗ kv. There exists a (set) bijection φ from
×
v∈V ∗
Fpkv to Fpk . Let y(i) = φ(y
(i)
v : v ∈ V ∗). We use the
following result by Nitinawarat and Narayan [9], which says
that there exists a linear function of the sources that can act
as the secret key.
Lemma 5 (Lemma 4.5, [9]). Let Y be a random vari-
able in a Galois field Fq and D be an Rn-valued
random variable jointly distributed with Y . Consider
Nout iid repetitions of (Y,D), namely (Y Nout , DNout) =
((Y1, D1), . . . , (YNout , DNout)).
Let B = B(Nout) ∈ B(Nout) be a finite-valued rv with a
given joint distribution with (Y Nout , DNout).
Then, for every δ > 0 and every
R < H(Y |D)−
1
Nout
log |B(Nout)| − 2δ,
there exists a ⌊NoutRlog q ⌋×Nout matrix L with Fq -valued entries
such that
NoutR−H(LY
Nout) + I(LY Nout ;DNout , B)
vanishes exponentially in Nout.
In other words, LY Nout is an ǫ-SK for suitable ǫ. Let q =
pk and B = (wv, sNoutv : v ∈ V ∗). Then, the above lemma
guarantees the existence of an Fpk -valued matrix L, so that
L(y(1), . . . , y(Nout))T is a secret key with a rate of
Rkey =
1
N
H(yv : v ∈ V
∗|dv : v ∈ V
∗)−
∑
v∈V ∗
R(v)com, (22)
where R(v)com denotes the total rate of communication of
terminal v. We give a lower bound on Rkey by bounding
H(yv : v ∈ V
∗|dv : v ∈ V
∗) in the next section.
F. Joint Entropy of the Quantized Sources
The proof of the following lemma is given in Appendix B-B.
Lemma 6. Fix a δ > 0, and let Di := (d(i)v : v ∈ V ∗). For
all sufficiently large n, we have
1
n
H(y(i)
v
: v ∈ V ∗|Di) ≥
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
σ2(Λ
r(T∗))
)
+
∑
u∈V ∗
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1− ρ2
u,par(u)
σ2(Λu)
)
− δ (23)
For every v, {y(i)v : 1 ≤ i ≤ Nout} are independent and
identically distributed. If D := {Di : 1 ≤ i ≤ Nout}, then
H(yv : v ∈ V
∗|D) = NoutH(y
(i)
v : v ∈ V ∗|Di). Substituting
for σ2(Λv) from (12) in (23), we get
1
N
H(yv : v ∈ V
∗|D) ≥ Rent − g(δ)− on(1),
where Rent is defined in (1), and g(δ) is a quantity that goes
to 0 as δ → 0.
G. Achievable Secret Key Rate and Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 5 guarantees the existence of a strong secret
key which is a linear transformation of (y(1), . . . , y(Nout)).
From Propositions 3 and 4, all terminals are able to recover
(y(1), . . . , y(Nout)) with a probability of error that decays
exponentially in N = nNout.
During the analog phase, each terminal v in V ∗ publicly
communicates
R
(v)
analog =
1
n
log2
vol(Λ
(1)
v )
vol(Λv)
≤ max
u∈NT (v)
1
2
log2
(
1− ρ2
uv
+ σ2(Λv) + ρ
2
uv
σ2(Λu)
)
σ2(Λv)
+ on(1) + δ. (24)
bits per sample. Here, we have used the fact that an MSE
quantization-good lattice Λv satisfies vol(Λv) → 2πeσ2(Λ) as
n → ∞. We know from (21) that during the digital phase,
terminal v communicates 2δR(v)q bits per sample across the
public channel. The total rate of communication by terminal
v is therefore
R(v)com ≤ max
u∈NT (v)
1
2
log2
(
1− ρ2
uv
+ σ2(Λv) + ρ
2
uv
σ2(Λu)
)
σ2(Λv)
+ δ(1 + 2R(v)q ) + on(1) (25)
bits per sample. Using Lemma 6 and (25) in (22), and finally
substituting (12), we obtain (4). All that remains now is to
find an upper bound on the computational complexity of our
scheme.
H. Computation Complexity
We now show that the computational complexity is polyno-
mial in the number of samples N . The complexity is measured
in terms of the number of binary operations required, and
we make the assumption that each floating-point operation
(i.e., operations in R) requires O(1) binary operations. In
other words, the complexity of a floating-point operation is
independent of N .
Recall that N = nNout, where Nout = minv∈V ∗(2nR
(v)
q −
1). Also, α = (maxv∈V ∗ R(v)q )/(minv∈V ∗ R(v)q ).
• Quantization: Each lattice quantization operation has
complexity at most O(2nR
(v)
q ) = O(Nαout). There are
Nout such quantization operations to be performed at
each terminal, and hence the total complexity is at most
O(Nα+1out ).
• Analog Phase: Terminal v performs Nout quantization
and modΛ(1)v operations to compute {w(i)v : 1 ≤ i ≤
Nout}, and this requires a total complexity of O(Nα+1out ).
Computation of {ŷ(i)v : 1 ≤ i ≤ Nout, v ∈ V ∗} requires
at most Nout(|V ∗| − 1) quantization operations, which
also has a total complexity of O(Nα+1out ).
• Digital Phase: Each terminal has to compute the coset
representative. This is followed by the decoding of the
Reed-Solomon code. Both can be done using the Reed-
Solomon decoder, and this requires O(Nout log2Nout)
operations in Fpkv . Each finite field operation on the other
hand requires O(log22 pkv) = O(n2) binary operations [5,
Chapter 2]. The total complexity is therefore O(N2).
• Secret Key Generation: This involves multiplication of a
⌊NoutRlog2 q
⌋×Nout matrix with an Nout-length vector, which
requires O(N2out/ log q) operations over Fq. Hence, the
complexity required is O(N2out log q) = O(N2).
From all of the above, we can conclude that the complexity
required is at most O(Nα+1). If the quantization rate con-
straints are the same, i.e., R(u)q = R(v)q , then the complexity is
O(N2). This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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APPENDIX A
LATTICE CONCEPTS
In this appendix, we briefly review basic lattice concepts
that are relevant to this work. We direct the interested reader
to [1], [3], [4], [13] for more details. Let A denote a full-rank
n×n matrix with real entries. Then the set of all integer-linear
combinations of the columns of A is called a lattice in Rn, and
A is called a generator matrix of the lattice. Given a lattice Λ
in Rn, we define QΛ : Rn → Λ to be the lattice quantizer that
maps every point in Rn to the closest (in terms of Euclidean
distance) point in Λ, with ties being resolved according to a
fixed rule. The fundamental Voronoi region, V(Λ), is the set
of all points in Rn for which 0 is the closest lattice point,
i.e., V(Λ) := {x ∈ Rn : QΛ(x) = 0}. For any x ∈ Rn, we
define [x] mod Λ := x − QΛ(x). We also define vol(Λ) :=
vol(V(Λ)). The covering radius of Λ, denoted rcov(Λ) is the
radius of the smallest closed ball in Rn centered at 0 that
contains V(Λ). Similarly, the effective radius, reff(Λ), is the
radius of a ball in Rn having volume vol(Λ).
The second moment per dimension of a lattice, σ2(Λ) is
defined as
σ2(Λ) =
1
nvol(Λ)
∫
x∈V(Λ)
‖x‖2dx,
and is equal to the second moment per dimension of a ran-
dom vector uniformly distributed over V(Λ). The normalized
second moment per dimension of Λ is defined as
G(Λ) :=
σ2(Λ)
vol(Λ)2/n
.
If Λ and Λ0 are two lattices in Rn that satisfy Λ0 ⊂ Λ,
then we say that Λ0 is a sublattice of Λ, or Λ0 is nested in
Λ. Furthermore,
|Λ ∩ V(Λ0)| =
vol(Λ0)
vol(Λ)
.
We say that a lattice Λ (or more precisely, a sequence of
lattices {Λ} indexed by the dimension n) is good for mean
squared error (MSE) quantization if
lim
n→∞
G(Λ) =
1
2πe
.
A useful property is that if Λ is good for MSE quantization,
then vol(Λ)2/n → 2πeσ2(Λ) as n → ∞. We say that Λ
is good for covering (or covering-good or Rogers-good) if
rcov(Λ)/reff(Λ)→ 1 as n→∞. It is a fact that if Λ is good
for covering, then it is also good for MSE quantization [4].
Let Z be a zero-mean n-dimensional white Gaussian vector
having second moment per dimension equal to σ2. Let
µ :=
vol
(
V(Λ)
)2/n
σ2
.
Then we say that {Λ} is good for AWGN channel coding (or
AWGN-good or Poltyrev-good) if the probability that Z lies
outside the fundamental Voronoi region of Λ is upper bounded
by
Pr[Z /∈ V(Λ)] ≤ e−n
(
EU (µ)−on(1)
)
for all σ2 that satisfy µ ≥ 2πe. Here, EU (·), called the Poltyrev
exponent is defined as follows:
EU (µ) =

µ
16pie if 8πe ≤ µ
1
2 ln
µ
8pi if 4πe ≤ µ ≤ 8πe
µ
4pie −
1
2 ln
µ
2pi if 2πe ≤ µ ≤ 4πe.
(26)
Suppose that we use a subcollection of points from an AWGN-
good lattice Λ as the codebook for transmission over an
AWGN channel. Then, as long as
vol
(
V(Λ)
)2/n
σ2
≥ 2πe,
the probability that a lattice decoder decodes to a lattice point
other than the one that was transmitted, decays exponentially
in the dimension d, with the exponent given by (26).
Lattices that satisfy the above “goodness” properties were
shown to exist in [4]. Moreover, such lattice can be constructed
from linear codes over prime fields. Let p be a prime number,
and C be an (n, k) linear code over Fp. In other words, C
has blocklength n and dimension k. Let φ be the natural
embedding of Fp in Z, and for any x ∈ Fnp , let φ(x) be the
n-length vector obtained by operating φ on each component of
x. The set Λ := φ(C) + pZn := {φ(x) + py : x ∈ C,y ∈ Zn}
is a lattice, and is called the Construction-A lattice obtained
from the linear code C. With a slight abuse of notation, we
will call any scaled version of Λ, i.e., αΛ for any α > 0,
a Construction-A lattice obtained from C. A useful fact is
that Λ always contains pZn as a sublattice, and the nesting
ratio Λ/pZn = pk. It was shown in [4] that if k and p
are appropriately chosen functions of n, then a randomly
chosen Construction-A lattice over Fp is good for covering
and AWGN channel coding with probability tending to 1 as
n→∞.
We use the nested lattice construction in [3], [6] to obtain
good nested lattices. Let Λ0 be a Construction-A lattice which
is good for covering and AWGN, and let A be a generator
matrix for Λ0. Then, if Λ′ is another Construction-A lattice,
then Λ = p−1AΛ′ is a lattice that contains Λ0 as a sublattice.
It was shown in [6] that if Λ and Λ0 are chosen at random,
then they are both simultaneously good for AWGN channel
coding and covering with probability tending to 1 as n→∞
(provided that k and p are suitably chosen).
APPENDIX B
TECHNICAL PROOFS
A. Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that
y(i)
u
= [QΛu(x
(i)
u
+ d(i)
u
)− d(i)
u
] mod Λ(2)
u
=
[
x(i)
u
− [x(i)
u
+ d(i)
u
] mod Λu
]
mod Λ(2)
u
= [x(i)
u
+ d˜(i)
u
] mod Λ(2)
u
, (27)
where d˜(i)u is uniformly distributed over V(Λu) and is inde-
pendent of x(i)u [3, Lemma 1]. Since Λu is good for MSE
quantization, Λ(2)u is good for AWGN and (18) is satisfied, we
can use [4, Theorem 4] to assert that5 the probability
Pr[y(i)
u
6= x(i)
u
+ d˜(i)
u
] ≤ e−n(E1(δ)−on(1)) (28)
where E1(δ) > 0 for all δ > 0. Similarly, we can write
y(i)
v
= [x(i)
v
+ d˜(i)
v
] mod Λ(2)
v
,
where d˜(i)v is independent of x(i)v , and
Pr[y(i)
v
6= x(i)
v
+ d˜(i)
v
] ≤ e−n(E2(δ)−on(1)) (29)
where E2(δ) > 0 for all δ > 0.
Recall that w(i)v = [y(i)v ] mod Λ(1)v . We can write
ŷ(i)
v
= w(i)
v
+Q
Λ
(1)
v
(ρuvy
(i)
u
−w(i)
v
)
= w(i)
v
+Q
Λ
(1)
v
(
ρuvy
(i)
u
− y(i)
v
+Q
Λ
(1)
v
(y(i)
v
)
)
= w(i)
v
+Q
Λ
(1)
v
(y(i)
v
) +Q
Λ
(1)
v
(
ρuvy
(i)
u
− y(i)
v
)
= y(i)
v
+Q
Λ
(1)
v
(
ρuvy
(i)
u
− y(i)
v
)
(30)
From (28) and (29), we know that y(i)v = x(i)v + d˜(i)v and
y
(i)
u = x
(i)
u + d˜
(i)
u with high probability. Now,
ρuvx
(i)
u
− x(i)
v
= −
√
1− ρ2
uv
z(i)
vu
,
and again using the AWGN goodness property of Λ(1)v and
(16), we have
Pr
[
Q
Λ
(1)
v
(−
√
1− ρ2
uv
z(i)
vu
+ d˜(i)
u
− d˜(i)
v
) 6= 0
]
≤ e−n(E3(δ)−on(1)) (31)
where E3(δ) > 0 for δ > 0. Using (28), (29) and (31), we get
that
Pr[ŷ(i)
v
6= y(i)
v
] ≤
3∑
i=1
e−n(Ei(δ)−on(1))
which completes the proof of the proposition.
5Note that there is a slight difference here since d˜(i)
u
is not Gaussian.
However, the arguments in [3, Theorem 5] can be used to show that x(i)
u
+d˜
(i)
u
can be approximated by a Gaussian since Λu is good for MSE quantization.
B. Proof of Lemma 6
We prove the result by expanding the joint entropy using
the chain rule, and then use a lower bound on the entropy of
a quantized Gaussian. To do this, we will expand the joint
entropy in a particular order. Let S be any (totally) ordered
set containing the vertices of T ∗ and satisfying the following
properties:
• maxv S = r(T
∗), i.e., r(T ∗) ≥ v for all v ∈ S.
• v > u if the distance between v and r(T ∗) is less than
that between u and r(T ∗).
Essentially, v > u if v is closer to r(T ∗) than u, and we do not
care how the vertices at the same level (vertices at the same
distance from r(T ∗)) are ordered. Let D = (d(i)v : v ∈ V ∗).
Then,
H(y(i)
v
: v ∈ V ∗|D) = H(y
(i)
r(T∗)|D)
+
∑
v∈V ∗\r(T∗)
H(y(i)
v
|D,y(i)
u
: u > v)
≥ H(y
(i)
r(T∗)|D)
+
∑
v∈V ∗\r(T∗)
H(y(i)
v
|D,x(i)
u
: u > v)
(32)
= H(y
(i)
r(T∗)|D)
+
∑
v∈V ∗\r(T∗)
H(y(i)
v
|D,x
(i)
par(v))
(33)
where (32) follows from the data processing inequality. We
would like to remark that (33) is the only place where we use
Markov tree assumption. The rest of the proof closely follows
[9, Lemma 4.3], and we give an outline. The idea is to find the
average mean squared error distortion in representing x(i)v by
y
(i)
v (with or without the side information x(i)par(v)), and then
argue that the rate of such a quantizer must be greater than or
equal to the rate-distortion function.
Claim B.1.
1
n
H(y
(i)
r(T∗)|D) ≥
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
σ2(Λ
r(T∗))
)
− on(1). (34)
Making minor modifications to the proof of [9, Lemma
4.3], we can show that conditioned on D, the average MSE
distortion (averaged over D) between x(i)
r(T∗) and
x̂
(i)
r(T∗) =
1
1 + σ2(Λ
r(T∗))
y
(i)
r(T∗)
is at most σ
2(Λ
r(T∗))
1+σ2(Λ
r(T∗))
+on(1). Since any rate-distortion code
for quantizing x(i)
r(T∗) must have a rate at least as much as the
rate-distortion function, we can show that (again following the
proof of [9, Lemma 4.3]) Claim B.1 is true.
Claim B.2.
1
n
H(y(i)
v
|D,x
(i)
par(v)) ≥
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1− ρ2
v,par(v)
σ2(Λv)
)
− on(1)
(35)
The proof of the above claim also follows the same tech-
nique. We can show that conditioned on D and x(i)par(v), the
average MSE distortion between
√
1− ρ2
uv
z
(i)
vu and
ẑ(i)
vu
=
(1− ρ2
uv
)
1− ρ2
uv
+ σ2(Λv)
[
y(i)
v
− ρuvx
(i)
par(v)
]
mod Λ(2)
v
is (1−ρ
2
uv
)σ2(Λv)
1−ρ2
uv
+σ2(Λv)
+on(1). Arguing as before, the claim follows.
Finally, using (34) and (35) in (33) completes the proof of
Lemma 6.
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